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IS THE HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY MORE LIKELY TO REPRICE STOCK
OPTIONS?

Basak Denizci

ABSTRACT
Hospitality companies are known to be sensitive to the economy and movements in the
market. When overall performance of the company is poor because of a market wide fall,
hospitality managers should not be panelized for the decrease in the stock price. In such
cases, it is acceptable to reprice the stock option to realign the incentives and to minimize
the agency problem. This paper examines whether repricing of hospitality firms are more
likely to reprice options after a stock price decrease that is accompanied by a market wide
fall. Although the overall results are consistent with prior literature, the hypothesis is
marginally supported.

1. Introduction
Repricing refers to setting a new, lower exercise price for stock options readily
available, because the stock price has fallen since the original award. More specifically,
repricing makes sure that the executive gets paid and continue to increase their personal
wealth no matter what happens to the market price of company’s stock which eliminates
a lot of risk for the executives. Although the repricing of stock options is not a very
common phenomenon, when it happens it attracts a lot of attention from the press and
professionals. Companies usually reprice to restore the power of managers’ option based
incentives when the company stock price decreases significantly due to the market wide
fall or poor industry performance (Chen, 2004; Chance at al., 2000). Repricing of stock
options is criticized in general because it is seen as a mechanism to reward the managers
for poor performance.
This study examines the repricing issue in the hospitality industry. The hospitality
industry sets itself apart from other industries in that it is very sensitive to the economy,
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and it is intensely leveraged. Hotel establishments also have real estate components
attached, which makes them capital intensive. They operate in extremely competitive
markets and are considered to be high risk/high reward investments
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Global Hospitality and Leisure Services, 2002).
Repricing issue has never been explored for the hospitality firms although the
performance of this specific industry is very dependent on the market movements. Mostly
related to the hospitality industry, Rogers (2003) examined the repricing events of casino
companies between 1993 and 1998. He concluded that repricing helps casino firms to
decrease excessive risk taking incentives of executives. Hospitality Sales & Marketing
Association International's (HSMAI) announced the "Top 10 Issues of Concern" facing
sales and marketing executives and staff with the number one issue being the current
economic situation (Khan, 2004). This information was gathered from a survey that was
sent to 7,000 members of HSMAI. Many articles in the press draw attention to the hotel
and restaurant industry’s sensitivity on economic developments. The main theme of these
articles is that strong economy helps hotels enjoy robust health and good profits and it is
time to invest in lodging. However, weak economy pulls the stock prices down
significantly (for example, The Washington Post (March 2, 1997), Wall Street Journal
(August 18, 1999), Chicago Tribune (January 20, 2000), Hotel and Motel Management
(January 15, 2001)). The intuition behind the arguments of the press and industry
professionals is that, in an economic downturn, people would be less likely to travel and
spend their money on travel related expenses such as staying in a hotel and participating
travel related activities. In addition, dining out is among the first things that people
consider cutting down when they need to save. Even amount of corporate travel decreases
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when the economy is not in a good state. On the contrary, people do not mind spending
their money on staying in hotels and dining out in the times of robust economy. These
economic movements and their consequences are obviously not in the control of the
management.
Overall performance of the company may go down just because of the market
wide fall, which is out of managers’ control; and hospitality managers should not be
penalized for the decrease in the stock price. Thus, this paper will examine whether the
hospitality firms are more likely to reprice options after a stock price decrease that is
accompanied by a market wide fall compared to a matched sample of non-hospitality
firms.
This paper proceeds in the following format. Background information on stock
options and options pricing are presented in Section 2. Section 3 explains the data
collection and the related tests. Results of the study are explained in Section 4. Section 5
provides the conclusion.

2. Background information and previous research on stock options and option pricing
2.1 Stock Options
Corporate governance is concerned with the system by which businesses are run.
This system includes the executive’s responsibility to ensure that the business is
appropriately and honestly managed. One of the challenges of powerful corporate
governance is to minimize the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According
to the agency theory, CEO behavior is mostly unobservable. Given this constraint, an
optimal pay contract should be closely linked to company’s performance (Miller, 1995;
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Akhigbe, Madura and Tucker, 1995; Madura, Martin and Jessel, 1996, Attaway 2000).
Offering stock options is one of the ways to decrease agency problem. Other popular
mechanisms such as presence of board of directors, threat of takeover also exist to
minimize the potential conflict of interests between the shareholders and managers.
Granting stock options to CEOs helps to line up the incentives of the executives
with the interests of shareholders (Kerr & Bettis, 1989, Hall & Liebman; 1998). Most
U.S. companies award stock options once a year. A compensation committee gives the
decisions on the size and timing of the stock option awards. This committee is usually
composed of the board of directors. (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988). A stock option
grants the CEO right to acquire shares at a specific price (exercise price) at a later date.
More than 90% of large U.S. companies issue stock options and executive stock options
are about 60% of total CEO compensation (Deshmuhk, Howe, Luft; 2002). 10 years is a
typical time to expiration on the award date.
After the connection between company’s performance and optimal CEO contract
has been established, some other studies found positive effect of performance on pay
(Sigler and Porterfield, 2001; Core, Holthausen and Larker, 1999; Guay, 1999; Lambert
and Larker, 1987; and Joyce, 2001). However, CEO compensation is not always tied to
the firm’s performance. Sometimes CEOs are getting paid well even though they fail to
achieve positive results (Behr, 1997). In good states of the economy, firms can achieve
good results without much effort, which eventually results in high pay levels.
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2.2 The Repricing Provision
A stock option provision typically changes the exercise price of old options and/or
cancels old options and reissues new options following a stock price decrease. Repricing
can be often seen as a tool to reward the employees for their poor performance (Chance,
Kumar, Todd; 2000). But there is a rational explanation behind repricing the stock option.
Some of the incentive effects might be lost to the CEO, which increase the agency
problem, after a sharp decrease in the stock price (Dalton and Dalton, 2005). Also,
employees should not be penalized because of a decrease in the stock price that is not
traceable to their actions. In such a situation, compensation committee can review the
situation. Usually, executives also demand their options to be repriced. Considering that
around 60% of the CEO compensation is related to the stock options, it is reasonable to
believe that CEOs and top-level executives would raise their voices to the board of
directors and/or compensation committee for a change in the exercise price of old
options. It is up to the board of directors and/or compensation committee to make the
ultimate decision given that repricing provision is not a part of the original contract
(Corrado, Jordan, Miller, and Stansfield, 2001). According to Dalton and Dalton (2005),
offering stock options is necessary to motivate the new top management team. However
option repricing does not meet its stated purpose which is aligning the concerns of the top
executives with those of shareholders.
Repricing of stock options has been a controversial subject since the early 1990’s.
Many articles in the business, professional, and popular press have attacked the practice
(For example, USA Today (April 29, 1997), The Wall Street Journal (October 29, 1997),
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The New York Times (July 15, 1998).) There are two different points of view on
repricing. Some claim that repricing is a useful means of restoring incentives and
retaining executive talent since the incentives related to the stock options will lose their
meaning with a deep decline in the stock price. Some others believe that repricing stock
options is solely rewarding the employees for their poor performance. Thus the
companies should stay away from using repricing provision. Shareholders and
institutional investors are among the opponents to the repricing provision while managers
and executives obviously support it.
The academic research on repricing in general concentrates on the characteristics
of the repricing firms. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) found that the repricing firms
significantly underperformed the market for six years until the repricing date. Saly (1994)
stated that option grants increased significantly after the market crash. However the
increase in the option grants is greater for those firms whose stock fell by the largest
percentage. Brenner et al. (2000) showed that the likelihood of repricing is more for
smaller firms and for firms with poor performance. Chance at al. (2000) stated that the
repricing firms have greater agency problems, they are smaller in size and they have
insider-dominated boards. Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003) found that the firms that
choose to reprice are younger and more likely to have smaller boards. Chen (2004)
provided evidence that firms with less stockholder control are more likely to maintain
reprice flexibility. Callaghan et al. (2004) examined the timing of option repricing and
reported that repricings are timed to coincide with the release of good news or bad news
about the company. For example, managers who expect favorable earning reports, reprice
before the announcement. Similarly, the managers who anticipate unfavorable earning
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reports reprice after the announcement. In addition, Callaghan et al. (2004) calculated
that repricings boosted executives' pay by an average of nearly $500,000 each. Evidently,
taking advantage of the company information systematically helps the executives to
increase their personal wealth.
New accounting treatment came into effect on December 15, 1998. As a part of
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) interpretation No. 44, companies are
required to expense to earnings any consequent stock price approval above the new
exercise price.
2.3 Research Purpose
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether hospitality firms are more
likely to reprice options after a stock price decrease that is accompanied by a market wide
fall.
2.4 Research Hypothesis
Given that hospitality industry is considered to be very sensitive to the economy,
it can be argued that when economy turns, hotels and restaurants do poorly in general.
However, this is not executives’ fault so s/he should not be punished (e.g. in terms of
lower rate of increase in her/his compensation in the following period). Given this
condition, the following hypothesis has been developed: Hospitality companies are more
likely to reprice options after a stock price decrease that is accompanied by a market wide
fall compared to a control sample of non-hospitality companies that are matched on size
and stock price decrease.

3. The data and methods
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Firm level data was collected from Compustat database for the years from 1993 to
2003. Hospitality sample includes hotel companies (SIC 7011) and restaurant companies
(SIC 5812). It is required that all firms in the sample are covered in CRSP and Compustat
databases.
To obtain repricing of stock options, 2003 proxy statements in U.S. Security
Exchange Commission (SEC) database were examined. In 1993, SEC started to require
the firms to provide any kind of repricing information in their proxy statements. Proxy
statements are designed to give a voting shareholder all the information necessary to
make an informed decision. According to the SEC, if a firm reprices in 2002, it must
provide a ten-year history detailing any previous repricings for at least the CEO and four
highest paid executives (Chance et al., 2000). However, checking one proxy statement in
2003 was not enough to collect the information of any instances where companies
decided to reprice executive stock options. Chance at al. (2000) reported that about onethird of the firms in their sample did not mentioned repricing in their proxy statements in
spite of SEC regulation. Taking this into consideration, two other databases (LexisNexis
and Mergent Online) were employed to identify the firms with repricing policies.
Keyword research was used to identify the option repricing information between
1993 and 2003. Keyword research involves rational combinations of terms related to
repricing such as “eliminate”, “prohibit”, “restrict”, and “authority” with terms such as
“reprice”, “lower”, “cancel”, “reset” (Chen, 2004). Since numerous combinations have
been used to retrieve repricing related information, it is likely that all the references and
news related to repricing have been attained.
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After examining more than 130 firms in hotel and restaurant sector, 14 companies
and 15 repricing events were obtained. Only one restaurant company (Good Times
Restaurants) has two repricings, all the others have just one repricing. Among the
hospitality companies with repricing policies included in this study, 2 are hotel
companies and 13 are restaurant companies. The hotel companies that repriced are
Sholodge and Interstate Hotels and Resorts. The restaurant companies that repriced are
Ark Restaurants, Buffets Inc., Checkers Drive-in Restaurants, Denny’s, Good Times
Restaurants, Landrys Restaurants, Lone Star Steakhouse Saloon, Meritage Hospitality
Group, New World Restaurant Group, Roadhouse Grill, Shells Seafood Restaurants,
Shoney’s, Repricings took place between years 1995 and 2001.
It appears that 9 repricing occurred before December 15, 1998, all others occurred
after this date. On December 15, 1998, new accounting treatment for priced options
(FASB Interpretation No. 44) came into effect. It can be argued that after this provision
came into effect, companies would be even more careful when they are making repricing
decisions as it may end up affecting companies’ earnings significantly. Some hospitality
companies included the explanation in their proxy statements that their earnings can get
affected to a serious extent from the repricing provision as a reason not to reprice the
stock options (such as Applebees and Darden ). Note that most number of pricing (5
repricings) occurred in 1997 for hospitality companies in the time frame between 1993
and 2003. Year 1997 was used to test the hypothesis of this study.

3.1 Matched sample
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A control sample of firms that are similar in size and in prior year’s stock return
were constructed for the year 1997. I excluded financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and
utilities (SIC 4900- 4949). Firm sales are taken as a proxy for size. To be included in the
sample, a firm’s sales should be within 70-130% range of hospitality companies’ sales.
Among those selected firms, firms with closest prior stock return to the hospitality
company’s stock return in the sample were selected for matched sample. Data for
matched sample was also collected from CRSP and Compustat databases. In the sample
set, there were 103 hospitality and 103 non-hospitality companies. Among the hospitality
companies, 5 of them repriced stock options in 1997. Among the non-hospitality
companies, 2 of them repriced stock options in 1997.

3.2 Research Model
To test the hypothesis that hospitality companies are more likely to reprice
options after a stock price decrease that is accompanied by a market wide fall compared
to a control sample of companies that are matched on size and stock price decrease, the
model below is tested using logistic analysis:
Likelihood of Repricing = β0 + β1PSF + β2SIZE + β3LEV + β4DUM
Repricing = Repricing is 1 if the company repriced in 1997 and 0 otherwise.
Prior Stock Performance (PSF) = For the companies that repriced in 1997, prior stock
performance is prior year’s stock return. For those that did not reprice, lowest 1-year
return during year 1997 is measured as prior stock performance.
Firm size and firm leverage are used as control variables.
Firm Size (SIZE) = Prior literature shows that small firms are more likely to reprice
(Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003). Natural logarithm of 1997 sales is taken as a proxy
for the firm size.

10

Leverage (LEV) = Total debt / Total shareholders’ equity in 1997.
Hospitality Dummy (DUM) = Hospitality dummy is 1 for hospitality companies and 0
otherwise.

4. Results
4.1 Performance of the stock around the repricing event
Event study approach has been employed to examine whether the market reacts in
any way to the public announcement of hospitality firms' repricing. Percentage abnormal
returns and corresponding t-statistics for 14 repricing events are shown in Table 1 for a
window of ± 5 days around the proxy filing date. Date 0 is the filing date. Data for one
company could not be obtained from CRSP database. Abnormal return is the company
return in excess of market return. Both value and equal weighted CRSP NYSE-AMEXNASDAQ indexes were used for the market factor.
[Insert Table 1 here]

It appears that there is no significant market reaction to the public announcement
of repricing except 4 days after the announcement using abnormal return on equalweighted index and 1 day before the announcement using both value-weighted and equalweighted indexes. T-statistics even for the significant days are barely statistically
significant at 0.05 level (t-statistics are just above 2.00). This implies that the investors
may not be monitoring proxy filings carefully. In addition, proxy statements are very
technically written. It may be the case that the investors do not spend the time to go over
the details of this technical report. Also note that the major press covered only 3
repricings out of 15 events. So investors did not have the chance to read all the repricings
in the news. Alternatively, it is possible that the market does not observe repricing events
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in the hospitality industry as important information about the future performance of the
firm.

4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics of the companies that repriced in 1997 2
years prior to and 2 years after the event.
[Insert Table 2 here]

Market capitalization decreases from 1995 to 1996 which implies that the stock
prices of these companies have been decreasing for while and the decrease does not stop
on the repricing year and continues through 1999. Earnings per share, which is calculated
by dividing company’s profit by its number of outstanding shares is negative in years
between 1995 and 1999 with a decreasing trend every year. Return on equity ratio
indicates that repriced companies have been performing poorly. The level of leverage
used by these companies also keeps on increasing and it seems that the repriced firms
keep on increasing their debt levels. Sales show an increasing trend in general.

Table 3 illustrates the comparison of repriced and non-repriced companies in
terms of firm size, performance measures, leverage and stock returns for the event year
(1997).
[Insert Table 3 here]

Market capitalization rate, which is measured multiplying closing stock price in
1997 by the number of shares outstanding in 1997, is statistically significant. T-statistics
of –3.081 and the mean values of repriced versus non-repriced companies imply that size
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of the repricing firms are significantly smaller than the non-repricing companies. It can
be argued that size effect is related to the information and data availability about the
small firms. For example, small firms might be less known firms and it might be easier to
reprice stock options for these firms compared to the big firms with large number of
shareholders. This finding is also consistent with the previous research (Brenner et al,
2001; Chance et al., 2000). Stock price return is significantly less for repriced companies
during 1997. Examining the mean values, repriced companies have an average return of 32.25% whereas the non-repriced companies have an average return of 5%. Dividend per
share is on average $0.00 for the repriced companies and $0.20 for non-repriced
companies. T-statistics for this variable is also statistically significant. All other variables
on Table 3 are not significant. Performance measures such as earnings per share and
profit margin are lower for repriced companies compared to non-repriced companies in
1997. However, the difference is not significant. It is apparent but not surprising that
repriced companies’ financial performance is considerably lower than those of nonrepriced companies. The explanation is very simple and intuitive. Stock options may have
become “under the water” or “out of the money” as the stock prices decrease, and it is
more likely that repriced companies’ stock price also decreased along with their stock
returns and dividends per share. Thus, it makes more sense to restore value to underwater
options, which are virtually worthless, by setting a new exercise price for the stock
options. On the other hand, leverage ratio does not seem to differentiate repriced and nonrepriced companies.
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To identify whether the repricings were indeed following a market wide fall, the
return on market during 1997 was observed. I used CRSP NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ
indexes as a proxy.
[Insert Graph 1 here]
As it is illustrated in Graph 1, occurrence of market wide decreases is during
March, August and October in 1997. Referring to the repricing dates of hospitality
companies in 1997, it seems that repricings took place in months of February, April,
May, July and December. It seems that not all the repricings follow the market wide fall.
This provides some evidence that the executives of hospitality companies might be
indeed being awarded for their poor performance.

4.3 Who is more likely to reprice?
Logistic regression estimates the probability of repricing event occurring in year
1997 given the above independent variables. The results of the analysis are presented in
Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 here]

Pseudo R-squares for the model are 0.082 for Cox & Snell R-square and 0.310 for
Nagelkerke R-square. Only statistically significant variable is the prior stock performance
and all other variables included in the analysis are not significant. Exp(B) in the table
above denotes the odds ratio. The coefficients in logistic regression are in terms of the log
odds, that is, the coefficient 0.049 implies that a one-unit change in prior stock
performance results in a 0.049 unit change in the log of the odds. The fact that only 5
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hospitality companies repriced in 1997 and only 2 non-hospitality companies in the
matched sample repriced may have some influence on this insignificant result of size,
leverage and hospitality industry dummy variables. In the light of the regression analysis,
hypothesis that the hospitality companies are more likely to reprice options after a stock
price decrease that is accompanied by a market wide fall is rejected.

5. Research Limitations
This study can be considered as a preliminary investigation into repricing of stock
options in the hospitality industry. The empirical analysis for the most parts of this paper
was done for year 1997. It could provide more insight if this study was done considering
a longer time frame. Corporate governance the system by which organizations are
directed and controlled. In a corporate system, boards of directors are responsible for the
governance of their organization. In this respect, this paper is further limited by not
including other factors that may affect the repricing decision in a company such as the
size of the board, the presence and/or influence of the CEO on the board of directors, and
level of stockholder control.

6. Conclusions
This industry specific study builds on the previous literature regarding repricing
of stock options and makes a contribution to the existing hospitality management and
repricing literature. Furthermore it attempts to explain the occurrence of repricing for the
hospitality companies given the industry’s specific characteristics. The motivation of the
study is based on hospitality industry’s sensitivity to the market and to the economic
movements. When the stock price decreases as a result of market wide or industry wide
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fall, the hospitality managers should not be punished in terms of lower compensation.
Since the executive pay contracts are highly dependent to the stock options, a sharp
decrease in the stock price significantly affect their compensation.
There was marginal support for the hypothesis that, the hospitality companies are
more likely to reprice options after a stock price decrease that is accompanied by a
market wide fall compared to a control sample of companies that are matched on size and
stock price decrease. Examining 5 days before and 5 days after 14 repricing events, there
was not any sign of reaction to the public announcement of the events. The fact that only
3 of the 15 repricing events are covered in the press and technical nature of the proxy
statements might have an effect on this. When the financial characteristics of the
repricing companies in 1997 are observed 2 years prior to and 2 years after the event
year, it appears that these firms continue to perform poorly after the event year.
Comparison of the companies that choose to reprice in 1997 and those who did not
choose to reprice indicate that repricing firms are significantly smaller in size (in terms of
market capitalization), and have lower stock price return, dividends per share.
Overall, this paper makes an attempt to explain the repricing events in the
hospitality industry. Although I found support that firms reprice after a significant stock
price decrease, there is not enough evidence to support that the hospitality companies are
more likely to reprice after a sharp stock price decrease. The research suggests the need
for more studies on repricing of stock options in the hospitality industry.
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Table 1: Percentage Abnormal Returns and Corresponding t-statistics for 14 Repriced
Firms 5 Days Before and 5 Days After the Announcement Date
Day 0 is the filing date. The CRSP NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ index is used for market
factor.

Relative day

Value-weighted
index

-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5

Percentage
abnormal return
0.026
0.008
-0.001
-0.005
0.050
0.006
0.030
0.014
-0.005
-0.020
0.032

Equal-weighted
index
t-statistic
1.457
0.591
-0.075
-0.349
-2.455
0.457
1.669
1.803
-0.649
-1.902
1.482
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Percentage
abnormal return
0.023
-0.023
-0.036
-0.035
-0.051
0.060
0.027
-0.005
-0.009
-0.020
0.028

t-statistic
1.288
0.490
-0.199
-0.201
-2.499
0.542
1.506
1.419
-1.131
-2.040
1.284

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for 7 Repriced Firms in 1997
Selected measures of performance and leverage from annual accounting data 2 years
prior to and 2 years after event year are presented. Year 1997 is the repricing year. The
mean and standard deviation are presented. Data are obtained from Compustat.

EPS
ROA (%)
MC ($MM)
LEV (%)
SAL ($MM)

1995
Mean St. Dev
-0.53
1.31
-4.52 13.58
310.03 161.45
31.67 300.17
297.99 372.45

1996
Mean St. Dev
-1.22
2.82
-10.60 17.11
229.48 207.88
45.90 201.24
362.47 403.12

1997
Mean St. Dev
-1.14
2.40
-13.63 21.53
196.10 237.29
54.27 156.88
393.41 449.47

1998
Mean St. Dev
-0.50
1.12
-8.61 13.24
139.04 191.61
62.27 288.74
401.66 432.35

EPS=Earnings per share, ROA=Return on Assets, ROE=Return on Equity, MC=Market Cap,
LEV=Leverage, SAL=Sales
N=7
$MM = Millions of dollars
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1999
Mean St. Dev
-0.01
0.73
-2.24
9.62
130.34 146.25
167.83 326.74
396.77 404.33

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Repriced and Non-Repriced firms in 1997
Selected measures of performance and leverage from annual accounting data is presented
for year 1997. Mean comparisons and t-statistics are provided. Data are obtained from
Compustat files.
Repriced Non-Repriced
Sales ($MM)
Earnings per Share
Dividends per Share
Profit Margin (%)
Stock Price Return (%)
Market Capitalization ($MM)
Leverage (%)

393.41
-1.14
0.00
-10.68
-32.25
196.10
54.27

$MM = Millions of dollars
Reprice Companies: N = 7
Non-Reprice Companies: N = 199

22

710.10
0.36
0.20
-4.14
0.05
909.57
52.60

t-statistics
-1.437
-1.619
-6.339
-0.905
-2.968
-3.081
0.160

Table 4: Logistic Analysis
Logistic analysis output is presented. Dependent variable is repricing. Repricing is 1 if
the company repriced in 1997 and 0 otherwise. Independent variables are PSF, SIZE,
LEV and DUM. (PSF) = For the companies that repriced in 1997, prior stock
performance is prior year’s stock return. For those that did not reprice, lowest 1-year
return during year 1997 is measured as prior stock performance. (SIZE) = Natural
logarithm of 1997 sales is taken as a proxy for the firm size. (LEV) = Total debt / Total
shareholders’ equity in 1997. (DUM) = Hospitality dummy is 1 for hospitality companies
and 0 otherwise.
Coefficient

Wald

Sig.

Exp(B)

-3.016
-0.474
-1.114
0.001
-4.468

4.552
0.930
0.079
0.100
20.259

0.033*
0.260
2.081
0.067
0.000*

0.049
0.623
0.892
0.969
0.011

PSP
SIZE
LEV
DUM
Constant
* significant at 0.05 level
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Graph 1: Monthly Returns on NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ Indexes in 1997
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02

-0.04
-0.06
VWRETX

EWRETX

VWRETX: Value weighted CRSP NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ indexes
EWRETX: Equal weighted CRSP NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ indexes
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